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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

opposed to actual availability charges. Palm Coast argued that actual
service availability charges were available to the Commission as of
November 1996 when the Commission approved the new charges of Palm
Coast. The court rejected the Commission's argument that it was not
required to use the actual service availability records because they were not
in the record of the case. The court held that the Commission was capable
of taking notice of its own orders.
The court affirmed the remaining issues without discussion.
Julie E. Hultgren

GEORGIA
Goode v. Mountain Lake Invs., L.L.C., No. S99A01710, 1999 WL
1048240 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding the trial court had broad discretion
in fashioning an equitable remedy in a case to control the excess flow of
water running from one property to another).
The plaintiffs, David, Marjorie, and James Goode ("Goodes"), filed
suit against Mountain Lake Investments, L.L.C. ("MLI") claiming MLI
caused excessive surface water and sediment laden surface water to flow
onto the Goode's property. The Goodes' property lay at the bottom of a
forty-acre drainage basin, and MLI owned about fifteen acres of property
uphill from the Goodes. After acquiring its property, MLI added a road,
parking lot, and small manufacturing plant, and altered the property's
slope. The Goodes contended MLI's development diverted sediment laden
surface water onto their property causing a nuisance.
The trial court ordered MLI to reduce the flow of water from its
property to the Goodes' property to the level that existed prior to MLI's
development. MLI constructed a detention pond to correct the water flow
and sediment discharge problems. On the Goodes' request, the court
entered an order for permanent injunctive relief. The court noted that
siltation, caused by runoff from MLI's property, created the impetus for
the prior injunction, and the detention pond constructed by MLI alleviated
the problem. The court found that water flow from MLI's property to the
Goodes' property still exceeded the natural flow, but evidence showed this
problem existed prior to MLI's development. To remedy the situation, the
court found that the water flow needed to be controlled on the Goodes'
property with the construction of a ditch. Therefore, the court ordered
MLI to contribute fifty percent of the money needed to construct a ditch
across the Goodes' property.
The Goodes appealed the trial court's order. The Goodes first
contended the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring MLI to bring
Recent precedent,
the water flow back to pre-development levels.
however, held that a trial court's order to return surface water runoff to
pre-development levels constituted an "impossible and overreaching
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mandate," and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court held the trial
court had the discretion whether or not to require MLI to return the water
flow onto the Goodes' property to pre-development levels.
Second, the Goodes contended the trial court erred in finding that no
further reasonable remedies existed to limit the flow of water from MLI's
property to the Goodes' property beyond the limit attained by the detention
pond. Furthermore, the Goodes argued the trial court erred by ordering
the ditch to be constructed on their property rather than MLI's property.
The court stated that the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning
equitable remedies based on the exigencies of the case. Moreover, the
court would not disturb an injunction fashioned by the trial court unless it
found a manifest abuse of discretion. In reviewing the record, the court
could not conclude that requiring the parties to share the cost of
constructing a drainage ditch across the Goodes' property constituted an
abuse of discretion.
The dissent argued the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
fashion a remedy which addressed abatement of the nuisance, and by
compelling the affected party to bear responsibility to clean up a nuisance it
did not create. Furthermore, the dissent argued the majority overlooked
expert testimony that presented evidence of further reasonable steps
available for decreasing the water flow from MLI's property.
Ryan 0. Remners

Rouse v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, No. S99A1148, 1999 WL
1048241 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding that the Protection of Tidewaters
Act was not unconstitutional for vagueness of terms and neither infringed
on fundamental rights nor violated equal protection).
The Protection of Tidewaters Act ("Act"), passed in 1992, included
provisions that allowed the Department of Natural Resources
("Department") to order the removal of any "structure" that was located in
the "tidewaters" of the State. A grandfather provision allowed some
structures predating the Act to remain for a maximum of five years. Rouse
owned a houseboat and a river house on the tidal portion of the Altamaha
River. The houseboat consisted of a styrofoam bottomed, six-sided wood
frame bolted on top with a roof tied to a tree with four lines. The river
house was on stilts and was embedded in the river bottom with concrete
cylinders. The Department permitted Rouse's houseboat to remain until
1997, but denied a permit for the riverboat due to "sanitation and safety"
concerns.
Rouse argued the Act was unconstitutional on a variety of grounds.
The court addressed three central arguments: (1) the vagueness of the
terms "structure" and "tidewaters;" (2) the denial of equal protection; and
(3) an unconstitutional taking.
In addressing the first issue, the court noted that a statute would violate

